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ABSTRACT
Like other social media websites, YouTube is not immune
from the attention of spammers. In particular, evidence can
be found of attempts to attract users to malicious third-
party websites. As this type of spam is often associated with
orchestrated campaigns, it has a discernible network signa-
ture, based on networks derived from comments posted by
users to videos. In this paper, we examine examples of dif-
ferent YouTube spam campaigns of this nature, and use a
feature selection process to identify network motifs that are
characteristic of the corresponding campaign strategies. We
demonstrate how these discriminating motifs can be used as
part of a network motif profiling process that tracks the ac-
tivity of spam user accounts over time, enabling the process
to scale to larger networks.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General
– Security and protection; H.3.5 [Online Information Ser-
vices]: Web-based services
General Terms
Experimentation, Security
Keywords
Spam, YouTube, network motif analysis, social network anal-
ysis
1. INTRODUCTION
The popularity and success of YouTube, a video-sharing
website consisting for the most part of user-generated con-
tent, continues to grow. Recent statistics report that it now
receives more than four billion video views per day, with
sixty hours of video being uploaded every minute; increases
Figure 1: Spam campaign targeting YouTube, with a
small number of accounts each commenting on many
videos. Blue nodes are videos, orange nodes are user
accounts, the five spam accounts are highlighted in
red.
of 30% and 25% respectively over the prior eight months1.
However, as is the case with many other high-profile social
media websites, YouTube has attracted unwelcome attention
from spammers. In this paper, we are concerned with the
facility that permits users to post comments to videos, thus
providing a mechanism that can be used to propagate spam
messages. This can be achieved with relative ease given
the availability of bots2 that are used to post comments in
large volumes. It is important at this point to distinguish
between promoters and spammers [4], with the former us-
ing such tools to encourage channel or video views, whereas
the general objective of the latter is to entice users to visit
malicious third-party websites.
One of the findings of our previous work [19] was the dis-
covery of orchestrated campaigns targeting popular YouTube
videos with bot-posted spam comments. These campaigns
are often of a recurring nature, operating with periodic bursts
[26, 10] of activity on a continual basis. It appears that dif-
ferent campaign strategies are in use, for example, a large
number of user accounts each commenting on a small num-
ber of videos, or a small number of accounts each comment-
1http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/2012/01/
holy-nyans-60-hours-per-minute-and-4.html
2http://youtubebot.com/
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ing on many videos. An example of a campaign using the
latter strategy can be seen in Figure 1, taken from a network
derived from comments posted by users to videos within a
particular time period.
Our approach uses the concept of network motif profil-
ing [17, 16, 25] to detect the recurring activity of these
spam campaigns, where motif counts from the derived net-
works are tracked over time. Motifs are enumerated on an
egocentric basis, where an ego is a single user node within
the networks, and the resulting profiles of motif counts can
be used for user characterization in order to detect spam
activity. Our strategy has been to consider all motifs be-
cause we don’t assume any prior knowledge of the nature of
spam campaigns and motifs that might be characteristic of
spammers.
However, the enumeration of all motif instances present
in the user networks can be a lengthy process. At the same
time, we have found that certain discriminating motifs may
be used to identify particular strategies and the associated
users as they periodically recur. Given this, the objective
of this paper is to determine from a preliminary analysis
a discriminating subset of motifs for profiling, so that the
resulting improvement in performance would permit its ap-
plication to larger networks.
This paper begins with a description of related work in
the domain. Next, the methodology used by the detec-
tion approach is described in detail, from derivation of the
comment-based networks to the subsequent network motif
profile generation. We describe the feature selection process
used to identify a set of discriminating motifs, using profiles
associated with known spam user accounts. Results are then
presented from an evaluation of the modified process where
only these motifs are considered. This evaluation focuses on
performance improvement and the detection effectiveness.
Finally, the overall conclusions are discussed, and some sug-
gestions for future work are made.
2. RELATED WORK
2.1 Structural and spam analysis
The structure of YouTube has been analyzed in a number
of separate studies. Cha et al. [7] performed an extensive
study that focused on popularity distribution and evolution,
content distribution and the prevalence of duplication and
illegal uploads. Paolillo et al. [20] investigated the social
structure with the generation of a user network based on the
friendship relationship, focusing on the degree distribution.
They found that YouTube is similar to other online social
networks with respect to degree distribution, and that a so-
cial core exists between authors (uploaders) of videos. An
alternative network based on related videos was analyzed by
Cheng et al. [8]. Given that the resulting networks were not
strongly connected, attention was reserved for the largest
strongly connected components. These components were
found to exhibit small-world characteristics [23], with large
clustering coefficients and short characteristic path lengths,
indicating the presence of dense clusters of related videos.
Benevenuto et al. [3] created a directed network based
on videos and their associated responses. Similarly, they
found that using the largest strongly connected components
was more desirable due to the large clustering coefficients
involved. This was a precursor to subsequent work con-
cerned with the detection of spammers and content pro-
moters within YouTube [5, 4]. Features from the video
responses networks (e.g. clustering coefficient, reciprocity)
were used as part of a larger set to classify users accordingly.
Other YouTube spam investigations include the recent work
of Sureka [22], based on the detection of spam within com-
ments posted to videos. A number of features were derived
to analyze the overall activity of users, rather than focusing
on individual comment detection.
An extensive body of work has been dedicated to the anal-
ysis of spam within other online social media sites. For
example, Mishne et al. [18] suggested an approach for the
detection of link spam within blog comments using the com-
parison of language models. Han et al. [12] investigated the
use of a collaborative spam filtering scheme to block link
spams in blogs. Gao et al. [10] investigated the prolifer-
ation of spam within Facebook “wall” messages, with the
detection of spam clusters using networks based on message
similarity. This particular study demonstrated the bursty
(recurring) and distributed aspects of botnet-driven spam
campaigns, as discussed by Xie et al. [26]. The shortcom-
ings of URL blacklists for the prevention of spam on Twitter
were highlighted by Grier et al. [11], where it was found that
blacklist update delays of up to twenty days can occur. This
is a particular problem with the use of shortened URLs, the
nature of which was also analyzed by Chhabra et al. [9].
The long-term study by Lee et al. [15] involved the deploy-
ment of Twitter honeypots that resulted in the harvesting
of 36,000 candidate content polluters.
2.2 Network motif analysis
Network motifs [17, 21] are structural patterns in the form
of interconnected n-node subgraphs that are considered to
be inherent in many varieties of network, such as biologi-
cal, technological and sociological networks. They are often
used for the comparison of said networks, and can also indi-
cate certain network characteristics. In particular, the work
of Milo et al. [16] proposed the use of significance profiles
based on the motif counts found within networks to enable
the comparison of local structure between networks of dif-
ferent sizes. In this case, the generation of an ensemble of
random networks was required for each significance profile.
An alternative to this approach [25] involved the use of mo-
tif profiles that did not entail random network generation.
Instead, profiles were created on an egocentric basis for the
purpose of characterizing individual egos, encompassing the
motif counts from the entirety of egocentric networks within
a particular network.
The domain of spam detection has also profited from the
use of network motifs or subgraphs. Within a network built
from email addresses [6], a low clustering coefficient (based
on the number of triangle structures within a network) may
indicate the presence of spam addresses, with regular ad-
dresses generally forming close-knit communities, i.e. a rel-
atively higher number of triangles. Becchetti et al. [2] made
use of the number of triangles and clustering coefficient as
features in the detection of web spam. These two features
were found to rank highly within an overall feature set. Mo-
tifs of size three (triads) have also been used to detect spam
comments in networks generated from blog interaction [13].
It was found that certain motifs were likely to indicate the
presence of spam, based on comparison with corresponding
random network ensembles.
Separately, network motifs have also been used to char-
acterize network traffic [1]. A network was created for each
application (e.g. HTTP), and nodes within the network were
classified using corresponding motif profiles.
3. YOUTUBE COMMENT NETWORKS
3.1 Comment processing and network gener-
ation
In our previous work [19], we described the collection of
a data set3 that was undertaken in order to investigate con-
temporary spam comment activity within YouTube. We
opted for a specific selection of the available data given that
spam comments in YouTube tend to be directed towards a
subset of the entire video set, i.e. more popular videos gen-
erally have a higher probability of attracting attention from
spammers, thus ensuring a larger audience. A decision was
made to use only data to which access was not restricted,
namely the comments posted to videos along with the as-
sociated user accounts. To facilitate our objective of ana-
lyzing recurring spam campaigns, we periodically retrieved
the details and comments of popular videos on a continual
basis, using the Most Viewed standard feed provided by the
YouTube Data API4. The API also provides a spam hint
property within the video comment meta-data, which is set
to true if a comment has previously been marked as spam.
However, this property cannot be considered reliable due
to its occasional inaccuracy, where innocent comments can
be marked as spam, while obvious spam comments are not
marked as such.
Our methodology requires the generation of a network to
represent the comment posting activity of users to a set of
videos. Initially, comments made during a specified time in-
terval are selected from the data set described above. To
counteract obfuscation efforts by spammers in order bypass
their detection by any filters, a number of pre-processing
steps must then be executed. During this process, each com-
ment is converted to a set of tokens, followed by the removal
of stopwords along with any non-Latin-based words, as the
focus of this evaluation is English-language spam comments.
Punctuation characters are also removed, and letters are
converted to lowercase. A modified comment text is then
generated from the concatenation of the generated tokens.
As initial analysis found that spam comments can often
be longer than regular comments, any texts shorter than a
minimum length (currently 25 characters) are removed at
this point. Although the campaign strategies under discus-
sion here are concerned with attracting users to remote sites
through the inclusion of URLs in comment text, comments
without URLs are currently retained. This ensures the op-
tion of analyzing other types of spam campaigns, such as
those encouraging channel views, i.e. promoters [4], along
with the behaviour of regular users.
A network can then be generated from the remaining mod-
ified comment texts. This network consists of two categories
of node, users and videos. An undirected edge is created be-
tween a user and a video if at least one comment has been
posted by the user on the video, where the edge weight repre-
sents the number of comments in question. For the moment,
the weight is merely recorded but is not subsequently used
3The data set is available at http://mlg.ucd.ie/yt
4http://code.google.com/apis/youtube/getting_
started.html#data_api
when counting motifs within the network. To capture the
relationship between the users involved in a particular spam
campaign, undirected and unweighted edges are created be-
tween user nodes based on the similarity of their associated
comments. Each modified (tokenized) comment text is con-
verted to a set of hashes using the Rabin-Karp rolling hash
method [14], with a sliding window length of 3. A pair-
wise distance matrix, based on Jaccard distance, can then
be generated from these comment hash sets. For each pair-
wise comment distance below a threshold (currently 0.6), an
edge is created between the corresponding users if one does
not already exist.
Afterwards, any users whose set of adjacent nodes consists
solely of a single video node are removed. Since these users
have commented on only one video, and are in all likeli-
hood not related to any other users, they are not considered
to be part of any spam campaign. The resulting network
tends to consist of one or more large connected components,
with a number of considerably smaller connected compo-
nents based on videos with a relatively minor amount of
comment activity. Finally, an approximate labelling of the
user nodes is performed, where users are labelled as spam
users if they posted at least one comment whose spam hint
property is set to true. All remaining users are labelled as
regular users. Although this can lead to label inaccuracies,
the results shown later in this paper demonstrate that such
inaccuracies will be perceivable.
3.2 Network motif profiles
Once the network has been generated, a set of egocentric
networks can be extracted. In this context, given that the
focus is on user activity, an ego is a user node, where its
egocentric network is the induced k-neighbourhood network
consisting of those user and video nodes whose distance from
the ego is at most k (currently 2). Motifs from size three
to five within the egocentric networks are then enumerated
using FANMOD [24]. A set of motif counts is maintained
for each ego, where a count is incremented for each motif
instance found by FANMOD that contains the ego.
A network motif count profile is then created for each ego.
As the number of possible motifs can be relatively large (par-
ticularly if directed and/or weighted edges are considered),
the length of this profile will vary for each network gener-
ated from a selection of comment data, rather than relying
upon a profile with a (large) fixed length. For a particular
generated network, the profiles will contain an entry for each
of the unique motifs found in the entirety of its constituent
egocentric networks. Any motifs not found for a particular
ego will have a corresponding value of zero in the associated
motif profile.
As mentioned previously, the work of Milo et al. [16] pro-
posed the generation of a significance profile, where the sig-
nificance of a particular motif was calculated based on its
count in a network along with that generated by an ensem-
ble of corresponding random networks. These profiles then
permitted the subsequent comparison of different networks.
In this work, the egocentric networks are compared with
each other, and the generation of random ensembles is not
performed. An alternative ratio profile rp [25] is created
for each ego, where the ratio value for a particular motif is
based on the counts from all of the egocentric networks, i.e.:
rpi =
nmpi − nmpi
nmpi + nmpi + 
(1)
Here, nmpi is the count of the i
th motif in the ego’s motif
profile, nmpi is the average count of this motif for all motif
profiles, and  is a small integer that ensures that the ratio
is not misleadingly large when the motif occurs in only a
few egocentric networks. To adjust for scaling, a normalized
ratio profile nrp is then created for each ratio profile rp with:
nrpi =
rpi√∑
rp2j
(2)
The generated set of normalized ratio profiles usually con-
tain correlations between the motifs. Principal components
analysis (PCA) is used to adjust for these, acting as a di-
mensionality reduction technique in the process. We can
visualize the first two principal components as a starting
point for our analysis. This is demonstrated in Section 5.
4. DISCRIMINATING NETWORK MOTIFS
4.1 Identifying Typical Spam Accounts
In our previous work [19], we performed an experiment
that tracked two spam campaigns which we had discov-
ered following manual analysis of the data set. Two dis-
tinct campaign strategies were in use, i.e. a small number of
accounts each commenting on many videos (Campaign 1),
and a larger number of accounts each commenting on few
videos (Campaign 2). The experiment was run over a period
of seventy-two hours, starting on November 14th, 2011 and
ending on November 17th, 2011. In order to track the cam-
paign activity over time, this period was split into twelve
windows of six hours each. For each of these windows, a
network of user and video nodes was derived using the pro-
cess described in the previous section. A normalized ratio
profile was generated for each ego (user), based on the motif
counts of the corresponding egocentric network. Principal
components analysis (PCA) was then performed on these
profiles to produce 2-dimensional spatializations of the user
nodes, using the first two components. These spatializations
acted as the starting point for the analysis of activity within
the twelve time windows.
Although the comment spam hint property was used to as-
sist manual analysis, the previous work was an unsupervised
exercise in that no formal labelled training set was gener-
ated. In order to determine a set of discriminating motifs
for this paper, a training set with labelled data was required.
For this purpose, we identified time windows containing the
highest number of users belonging to the two campaigns.
This was achieved by initially locating suspicious (outlier)
users in the PCA spatializations (e.g. see Figure 4). In
particular, we paid closest attention to those spatializations
where the visible separation was greatest between the out-
liers and the majority of regular users.
Having confirmed these users as belonging to the spam
campaigns by analyzing their posted comments, two training
sets were created. These sets contained the normalized ratio
profiles for both the respective spam campaign users and
the regular users in the selected time windows. To avoid
any interference from other potential spam campaigns or
individual spam users, any other spam users active in the
window (i.e. those who had at least one comment marked as
spam) were removed in both cases. Although the possibility
exists for spam users not to be marked accordingly due to the
inconsistency of the spam hint property, it was felt that the
percentage of regular users that may in fact have been spam
users would be relatively minor and so no further filtering
was performed.
A third spam campaign (Campaign 3) was also active in
this seventy-two hour period. Its strategy appeared to use a
large number of users to each post almost identical messages
to a small (∼1) number of videos. It did not have the same
frequency as the other campaigns (it was not as prevalent in
the data set as the other two), but given the vast number of
spam accounts involved it was felt to be worthy of consider-
ation due to the potential addition of further discriminating
motifs. As before, a third training set containing a set of
spam and regular users for a particular window was created.
4.2 Feature Selection
Having generated the labelled training sets, we ranked the
features (motifs) using information gain to determine those
that would be characteristic of the classes of interest. Due
to the nature of the campaigns, the training sets contained
a relatively small number of campaign spam users compared
with that of regular users. To cater for this, we generated
random samples from the training sets by specifying the
maximum distribution spread of both classes. Different ra-
tios of regular users to spam users were available for the
three campaigns, given that varying numbers of users are
involved. Those ratios that generated the highest informa-
tion gain were chosen. Details of the instance samples can
be found in Table 1.
Campaign 1 2 3
Motifs 158 159 158
Regular:Spam ratio 5:1 3:1 2:1
Regular instances 30 66 136
Spam instances 6 22 68
Table 1: Campaign training set samples
A plot of the motif rankings and corresponding informa-
tion gain using the training set samples can be seen in Fig-
ure 2.
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Figure 2: Information gain rankings
A selection of 21 motifs was made from those that gener-
ated the highest information gain values, 7 for each of the
three campaigns. These motifs can be found in Table 2.
The selection was straightforward for campaign 3, as it was
merely a case of selecting the 7 most highly-ranked motifs.
However, as can be seen in Figure 2, a relatively large num-
ber of motifs were found to generate the highest information
gain value for both campaigns 1 and 2. In both cases, we
analyzed those motifs ranked highest, and made a selection
based on our knowledge of the campaign strategies following
manual analysis of the data set. For example, campaign 1
uses a small number of users commenting on a large number
of videos, and so those motifs containing more user-video
edges have been selected. For campaign 2, motifs have been
selected that highlight the fact that users appear to be more
likely to be connected to other users rather than videos. The
strategy of this campaign is to employ a larger number of
users, each commenting on a small number of videos, and
the potential for connectivity between users is higher given
the similarity of their comments. These motifs also reflect
the observed behaviour of users in the campaign often not
commenting on the same videos, as no two users share a
video node neighbour.
Campaign 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Campaign 2
8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Campaign 3
15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Table 2: Selected discriminating motifs - blue nodes
are videos, orange nodes are users.
Campaign 3 has some similarities with campaign 2, with a
large number of users each commenting on a small number of
videos. However, in this case, the number of users involved
is considerably greater, and each user tends to comment on
only one video. The similarity between the comments is also
higher, and so the motifs that were ranked highest are those
containing mostly edges between users, given the number of
cliques and near-cliques within the networks consisting ex-
clusively of user nodes. It should be mentioned here that the
use of such motifs can introduce a limitation to the detection
of spam users associated with such a campaign strategy. In
cases where videos have received highly similar comments
from a large number of regular users (e.g. an abundance
of comments containing references to a current holiday or
event), the corresponding egocentric networks may contain
many instances of the motifs that are indicative of this cam-
paign, resulting in their separation in the PCA spatializa-
tions. However, this information may be interesting from a
non-spam perspective.
5. EVALUATION
5.1 Optimization using discriminating motifs
Having selected the 21 discriminating motifs, a series of
experiments were run to analyze the spam activity within
the collected data set. For the purpose of this evaluation,
the experiments were focused upon tracking any campaigns
having similar strategies to those mentioned in the previous
section, i.e. a small number of accounts each commenting on
many videos (Campaign 1), and variants on a larger num-
ber of accounts each commenting on few videos (Campaigns
2 and 3). The period from December 1st, 2011 to January
16th, 2012 was split into windows of six hours each. For each
of these windows, a network of user and video nodes was
derived using the process described earlier, and a normal-
ized ratio profile was generated for each ego (user), based
on the motif counts of the corresponding egocentric net-
work. In this case however, only the 21 discriminating motifs
were enumerated. Following principal components analysis
of these profiles, the spatializations of the first two princi-
pal components act as the starting point for the analysis of
activity within the set of time windows.
As FANMOD [24] normally enumerates all motifs of a
particular size found within a specified network, a modifi-
cation to the source code was required in order to permit a
subset of required motifs to also be specified. We modified
the command-line version5 to accept a set of motif identi-
fiers as an additional input parameter. The enumeration
algorithm remains unchanged, instead, the specified motif
identifiers are used to filter the FANMOD output; any in-
stances found for motifs that are not members of this set
are discarded. As we perform additional post-processing of
the enumerated motif instances, this filtering results in a
noticeable improvement in performance.
Window Video nodes User nodes (spam) Edges
1 322 903 (222) 2974
2 335 559 (163) 1446
3 282 745 (157) 2057
4 283 932 (249) 2475
5 291 794 (214) 2848
6 269 470 (123) 1222
7 281 759 (190) 1931
8 282 976 (231) 2491
9 300 689 (163) 1795
10 330 551 (136) 1701
11 292 826 (168) 2586
12 302 958 (225) 2995
Table 3: Network details for all six-hour windows
from December 29th, 2011 to January 1st, 2012.
An analysis of the resulting PCA spatializations found
that campaigns 1 and 2 were regularly active during this
period. Other spam activity can also be seen, ranging from
an abundance of channel promotion messages from individ-
ual users, to other smaller-scale campaigns. To demonstrate
the effect of using a subset of discriminating motifs, a pe-
riod of seventy-two hours has been chosen where campaigns
5http://theinf1.informatik.uni-jena.de/~wernicke/
motifs/
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Figure 4: Spatialization of the first two principal components of the normalized ratio profiles for Window 5
(12am to 6am, December 30th, 2011) with 21 motifs (left) and all (161) motifs (right). Red nodes are users
with comments marked as spam, orange nodes are all other users. Most users are regular, and appear as
overlapping points at the top of the leftmost cluster. Both spam campaigns are highlighted.
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Figure 3: FANMOD and associated post-processing
execution times for all six-hour windows from De-
cember 29th, 2011 to January 1st, 2012 (average of
10 runs, error bars indicate the standard deviation).
1 and 2 were active, starting on December 29th, 2011 and
ending on January 1st, 2012. The network details for the
twelve six-hour windows can be found in Table 3.
For each of the networks in this period, FANMOD was ex-
ecuted once having specified the selected 21 motifs, and once
without specifying required motifs (all motifs were enumer-
ated). Figure 3 contains a plot of the FANMOD and asso-
ciated post-processing execution times for each window. As
might be expected, there is a noticeable difference in times
between the specification of the selected motifs, and the case
where all motifs are enumerated. On average, the execution
is faster by a factor of 3 when the discriminating motifs are
specified.
5.2 Effectiveness
The objective of this section is to demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of the discriminating motifs in the detection of
spam campaigns. As the PCA spatializations are used as
the starting point for any analysis, this will be addressed
through the comparison of two spatializations for Window 5
(12am to 6am, December 30th, 2011); one created using the
normalized ratio profiles generated from the enumeration of
the selected 21 motifs, and the other with profiles generated
from all motifs within the network. These spatializations
can be seen in Figure 4.
At a glance, both spatializations look extremely similar,
as expected given the high correlation between the motifs.
Here, users posting at least one comment marked as spam
(using the spam hint property) are in red, all other users are
in orange. The points corresponding to the spam campaign
users have been highlighted accordingly. In both cases, it
can be seen that:
1. The vast majority of users are regular, and appear as
overlapping points at the top of the leftmost cluster.
2. There is a clear distinction between the two different
campaign strategies, as these points are plotted sepa-
rately (both from regular users and each other).
3. The inaccuracy of the spam hint comment property is
demonstrated as the Campaign 2 cluster contains users
not coloured in red, i.e. none of their comments were
marked as spam. Similarly, the reverse is true with
the large cluster of regular users in that it contains a
certain number of users coloured in red.
Apart from the highlighted campaign clusters, other spam
nodes in the spatializations have been correctly marked as
such. For example, those users towards the bottom-left ap-
pear to be mostly individual spam accounts having similar
behaviour to the strategy of Campaign 1, but on a smaller
scale. They include users encouraging channel views, i.e.
promoters [4], and also a number of users belonging to a
separate campaign. Given the similarity of the spatializa-
tions, we can assume that the use of a subset of discriminat-
ing motifs in campaign detection can be just as effective as
Campaign 1
Campaign 2
Other spam users
Figure 5: Spatialization of the normalized ratio pro-
files for Window 5 (12am to 6am, December 30th,
2011) using motifs 4 and 12 from Table 2 (same
colour coding as Figure 4). Although both cam-
paigns are separated, most of the other spam users
have now moved to the cluster of regular users in
the top-left.
the results obtained when using all motifs. The results also
confirm the recurring nature of these campaigns, given that
the same campaigns were still active over a month after the
time period used in our previous work [19].
With a large number of motifs sharing high information
gain values (see Figure 2), the potential exists for achiev-
ing similar detection using a smaller number of motifs than
the set of 21 selected in Table 2. To illustrate this, we cre-
ated a final spatialization for Window 5 that was merely
a plot of the normalized ratio values for two discriminat-
ing motifs, one each for campaigns 1 (motif 4) and 2 (motif
12). This can be seen in Figure 5. As before, both sets of
campaign users are plotted separately from the cluster of
regular users and each other, highlighting the discriminat-
ing power of these two motifs. However, some of the users
having behaviour similar to the strategy of Campaign 1 are
now clustered with the regular users. As motif 4 represents
a user posting comments to many videos, it would appear
that it alone is not sufficient for the detection of those users
whose behaviour lies somewhere between that of Campaign
1 and regular users.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The presence of orchestrated spam campaigns can be de-
tected in YouTube, where sets of spam accounts are used to
periodically post comments to popular videos. These cam-
paigns can employ different strategies, for example, a large
number of user accounts each commenting on a small num-
ber of videos, or a small number of accounts each comment-
ing on many videos. In this paper, having derived networks
from comments posted by users to videos within a set of
time periods, we have characterized sets of user accounts
using a network motif profiling process, where motifs are
enumerated on an egocentric basis.
Rather than enumerating all motifs within the constituent
egocentric networks, we have found that characterization is
also possible with a subset of these motifs. We have used
a feature selection process to select sets of discriminating
motifs associated with campaign strategies within the data
set. Our results from enumerating these particular motifs
on networks from later time periods have demonstrated that
their detection of spam user accounts can be just as effective
as that achieved when all motifs are used. At the same time,
the resulting improvement in performance suggests that the
use of discriminating motifs would be appropriate for larger
networks, as the enumeration of all motifs can be a lengthy
process. The results also demonstrate the recurring nature
of these campaigns.
In this paper, we have identified three campaign strategies
along with their corresponding discriminating motifs. In the
future, it will be useful to identify other strategies that are
present in the data set. For example, we have found evi-
dence of other campaigns that tend to vary their strategies
over time. This can lead to difficulties in detection, given
that their behaviour can occasionally be similar to that of
regular users. Apart from identifying further discriminating
motifs, the current process may need to be modified to ac-
commodate these strategies. Another possibility for future
work is the derivation of other network representations from
the data set, as the comments network used in this paper is
just one abstraction of the underlying network structure.
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